In a typical bull market, private equity sponsors exit out of portfolio assets through IPOs, strategic sales and sponsor-to-sponsor buyouts. But the 2025 deal market has proven to be neither typical nor robust. Amid tariff uncertainty, higher-than-hoped for interest rates and volatile equity markets, traditional PE exits have slowed to a crawl in 2025.
Against
In the world of venture capital, there are certain investor rights that ensure the smooth execution of exit transactions. The primary such mechanism is the drag-along provision, under which one group of stockholders agrees in advance to sell or vote their shares in a sale of the company approved by another group of stockholders and/or by the board. Drag-along provisions often include a covenant by the drag-along shareholders not to sue over a drag-along sale, often including waivers of claims for breach of fiduciary duties. But are fiduciary duties of directors too important to allow them to be waived by stockholders? A recent Delaware Chancery Court decision puts guard rails on such waivers.Continue Reading Too Big to Waive? Enforceability of Drag-Along Covenants Not-to-Sue
What do founders, employees and investors in privately held companies all have in
common? Limited opportunity to sell their shares. That’s because of various legal, contractual and market factors that impede the sale of such securities, so liquidity is usually limited to acquisition of or public offering by the company. In recent years, there’s been
2021 was a spectacular year for the American venture capital ecosystem, with VC
investments, fundraising and exits all setting new highs. That according to the latest PitchBook-NVCA Venture Monitor, the self-described definitive review of the U.S. venture capital ecosystem. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict how 2022 will turn out for the VC industry,
Venture capital funds routinely negotiate for a right of redemption – the right to require the company to buy out their shares after a certain period of time if an exit has not occurred – as a key element of their exit strategy. But according to a recent case in Delaware, the VCs and the
Every founder of a growth startup dreams of a big, successful exit — a sale of the company for millions of dollars. But that dream could be shattered if the investors are able to cause the company to be sold prematurely with proceeds only equal to or barely exceeding the investors’ liquidation preferences, leaving little
The just completed IPO of Snap Inc. has received enormous buzz and plenty of press coverage, mostly about its eye-popping valuation and offering proceeds, the big winners among the founders and early investors and the millennials who bought shares. But not nearly as much attention has been given to Snap’s tri-class capital structure
Earlier this year, Union Square Ventures Managing Partner Fred Wilson famously referred to corporate VCs as “The Devil”, when he asserted that companies should not be investing in other companies, that they should be buying other companies but not taking minority positions in them, that the “access” rationale for corporate venture is a reason
Seed stage investment deals, i.e., those in a range of approximately $100,000 on the low end and around $1.3 million on the high end, are structured either as straight equity or as convertible loans. If straight equity, the company typically issues to the investor shares of preferred stock usually designated as Series Seed which includes
“The Founder of a $50 Million Startup Just Sold His Company — And He Didn’t Make a Dime”. Such was the provocative headline of the Business Insider article last year reporting the sad tale of young entrepreneur Lane Becker and how he and his management team received none of the acquisition proceeds on