In the world of venture capital, there are certain investor rights that ensure the smooth execution of exit transactions. The primary such mechanism is the drag-along provision, under which one group of stockholders agrees in advance to sell or vote their shares in a sale of the company approved by another group of stockholders and/or by the board. Drag-along provisions often include a covenant by the drag-along shareholders not to sue over a drag-along sale, often including waivers of claims for breach of fiduciary duties. But are fiduciary duties of directors too important to allow them to be waived by stockholders? A recent Delaware Chancery Court decision puts guard rails on such waivers.
Continue Reading Too Big to Waive? Enforceability of Drag-Along Covenants Not-to-Sue
to acquire Twitter for $44 billion. Each termination letter cites alleged false representations and blown covenants by Twitter in the merger agreement, purportedly justifying termination. Twitter’s response to each letter has been the equivalent of
capital investors for Series A funding. One startup is led by a serial entrepreneur founder, the other by a novice. Assume each will get funded. In all likelihood, the deal will happen quicker and the amount funded and pre-money
common? Limited opportunity to sell their shares. That’s because of various legal, contractual and market factors that impede the sale of such securities, so liquidity is usually limited to acquisition of or public offering by the company. In recent years, there’s been